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 1 
Abstract: 1 
The pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology industries have been confronted both by 2 
dwindling product pipelines and rapid developments in life sciences, thus demanding a 3 
strategic rethink of conventional R&D. Despite offering both industries a solution to the 4 
pipeline problem, the life sciences have also brought complex regulatory challenges for 5 
firms. In this paper, we comment on these industries' response to the life science 6 
trajectory in the context of maturing conventional small-molecule product pipelines and 7 
routes to market. The challenges of managing transition from maturity to new high-value 8 
added innovation models are addressed.  Further, we argue that regulation plays a critical 9 
role in shaping the innovation systems of both industries and, as such, we suggest 10 
potentially useful changes to the current regulatory system.11 
 2 
Introduction to the new life science industries 12 
The new molecular life sciences have transformed a range of R&D-driven industries over 13 
the past two decades, particularly in pharmaceuticals and agriculture. Both industries are 14 
susceptible to “technological shocks” as new scientific knowledge and path-breaking 15 
technologies broaden the spectrum of options for R&D and strategic management. The 16 
complexity of the life sciences, and the different implications of biotechnology and 17 
genomics for various parts of the R&D process, have created distributed innovation 18 
systems and company networks in both sectors [1-3].  Firm strategy is shaped by robust, 19 
though ever-changing, multi-layered and sometimes cumbersome regulatory systems that 20 
are located outside the core innovation system, but which continue to influence 21 
innovation at all times [4].  The success of multinational companies depends on a 22 
continuous flow of new, innovative products with clear routes to market and established, 23 
well-understood value systems. In pharmaceuticals, these have traditionally been small-24 
molecule blockbuster products in core therapeutic franchises. Similarly, until the early 25 
1990s, the dominant innovation model in the agricultural sector was global commodity 26 
crops. In both industries, new technologies, such as high-throughput screening and 27 
combinatorial chemistry, were embraced enthusiastically and brought product and 28 
process advances in the identification, validation and formulation of new chemicals.  29 
Rapid developments in the life sciences in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought 30 
new opportunities and challenges for both industries, and continue to do so today. Just as 31 
conventional product pipelines began to reach maturity, the new life sciences offered 32 
hope of developing radically different types of product and markets. For the 33 
pharmaceutical industry, recombinant proteins in the 1980s, monoclonal antibodies in the 34 
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1990s, and more recently stem cells, emerged as potential alternatives to blockbuster 35 
small molecule drugs. Similarly, in the late 1980s GM crops presented the agro-chemical 36 
industry with a radically new product portfolio disruptive to its prevailing R&D strategy.   37 
However, the life sciences also brought new competition for incumbent firms as smaller 38 
biotechnology companies with unique knowledge and expertise emerged. The path-39 
breaking nature of the new technologies and products, many with unknown risk profiles 40 
and without established routes to market, engender new regulatory hurdles that increase 41 
the cost of R&D and generate uncertainty. 42 
Our aim is to explore the evolution of the pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology 43 
industries in the context of emerging life science innovation and new regulatory systems, 44 
and suggest key lessons for future governance.  We use the term agro-biotechnology in 45 
this article to refer specifically to those agrochemical companies that linked with seed 46 
companies to produce GM crops.  We highlight the opportunities and challenges of 47 
managing transition from maturity to a new high-value-added innovation model subject 48 
to high regulatory hurdles and hope to spur a broader discussion about the systemic 49 
aspects of R&D-driven industries and the role of regulation in shaping innovation. 50 
 51 
From maturity to value-added innovation: challenges and opportunities 52 
Developments in the life sciences have reshaped the pharmaceutical and agro-53 
biotechnological industries.  During the 1980s and early 1990s, the largest multinational 54 
chemical firms had relatively integrated and complementary R&D strategies. Indeed, 55 
some had both health and agriculture divisions. This period of innovative activity was 56 
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characterised by a series of mergers and acquisitions as multinationals sought “buy-in” to 57 
new technology platforms [5].  58 
However, this “combination strategy” ended around the late 1990s. The two 59 
sectors separated their capabilities and pursued autonomous strategies of innovation 60 
through both merger and acquisition activities and strategic alliances. It became clear to 61 
senior managers that synergy between agriculture and pharmaceuticals at the discovery-62 
level was profitable only when both sectors were primarily interested in the source of 63 
chemical novelty, but not in the “gene” area [5,6]. Functional genomics could benefit 64 
both sectors, but disparities in profit margins [7] and technological and economic 65 
differences [8] did not make for long-term positive synergies.  66 
 67 
Responding to the “problem of maturity” 68 
In the early 1990s, both sectors struggled as conventional chemical-based products 69 
reached maturity and R&D pipelines narrowed. By “maturity”, we mean molecules had 70 
already been developed for easy targets and were now off-patent, so no longer generating 71 
large profits, and industry was concerned about the long-term sustainability of 72 
conventional blockbuster R&D models.  Both sectors searched for new R&D options. In 73 
agriculture, strategic planning focused on ‘a combination of chemical and biotechnology 74 
developments with varying degrees of synergistic interaction’ [9,10]. Companies 75 
embraced diversity in technological development [11]. As product pipelines matured, 76 
three distinct company strategies emerged to exploit the new life science trajectory (Box 77 
1). 78 
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Innovation strategies are cumulatively dependent on a company’s past history 79 
[12,13], and the resources and ‘dynamic capabilities’ of a firm influence its patterns of 80 
innovation [13]. The innovation strategies of agro-biotechnology companies in the 1980s 81 
and 1990s varied, depending on their existing strengths in product development and 82 
technology trajectories along with their overall vision for the future.  GM crops were a 83 
disruptive technology for most multi-national agro-biotechnology companies still 84 
benefiting from patented agro-chemical products, but were attractive to firms that had 85 
reached the limits of small molecule chemical innovation.  86 
In pharmaceuticals, the maturity problem and desire to move to high-value-added 87 
biotechnology-based products was also a driver of organisational change and 88 
restructuring. Traditionally, pharmaceutical R&D was a serendipitous activity in which 89 
chemical compounds were randomly screened and tested on known disease targets. Lead 90 
molecules were then optimised to produce lead candidates for further development. In the 91 
1980s and 1990s, advances in molecular biology, synthetic chemistry and screening 92 
technologies reshaped this R&D process [14] and created economies of scale and scope 93 
[15]. The emergence of potentially transformative life science technologies led to major 94 
industry restructuring, through internal reorganisation and merger, acquisition and 95 
strategic alliance activity [2,16,17]. Firms now coordinate an increasingly diverse range 96 
of R&D capabilities alongside the “normal” processes of organic growth [18]. However, 97 
despite the promises and strategic visions presented by the life sciences, various factors 98 
challenge large firms’ dominance in therapeutic innovation (Box 2).  99 
Together, these challenges, amongst others [24], continue to shape the evolution 100 
of the pharmaceutical sector and strategic management of R&D within individual firms, 101 
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with new R&D models and product development strategies emerging. For example, GSK 102 
developed Centers of Excellence for Drug Discovery in 2000, leading to its current 103 
decentralised R&D Hub structure [25,14], and most multinationals exploit public-private 104 
partnerships in both research and development. A good example is Pfizer’s current 105 
investment in Scotland’s Translational Medicine Research Collaboration (TMRC); 106 
focused on the identification and validation of novel biomarkers for drug development.  107 
Both the pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology industries have been forced to 108 
confront the challenges and opportunities of the molecular life science paradigm in the 109 
context of maturity of conventional product pipelines. For pharma, life science 110 
investment and attendant organisational restructuring has been primarily a response to the 111 
challenges of therapeutic innovation, rather than a revolutionary, pro-active attempt to 112 
fully embrace a life science-based innovation trajectory. Innovation spending in agro-113 
biotechnology has moved towards GM seed technology, with total agro-biotechnology 114 
R&D expected to equal agrochemicals in 2009 [26]. 115 
Our research on both the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries has shown 116 
that multinationals do not always share common objectives and strategies; rather, strategy 117 
is an evolutionary process based on firms’ unique histories, internal competencies and 118 
routines, market position and future expectations [2,9,14]. The long-lead times in 119 
pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology R&D mean that the precise benefits of any 120 
restructuring initiative and implantation of new strategy take time to emerge.  121 
Nevertheless, product innovation and company strategy is also determined by the 122 
regulatory environment and it is to this important aspect that we now turn.  123 
 124 
 7 
Regulation and its impact on innovation strategy and product development 125 
Regulation has significant impact on R&D-driven industries, such as pharmaceuticals and 126 
agro-biotechnology, and partly explains the long product lead times that distinguish these 127 
industries from most others, although even without formal regulation firms would still 128 
need to invest time and resource to establish product safety. Nevertheless, changes in 129 
standards for safety and efficacy do have time/cost implications for industry [27].  A 130 
significant effect of regulation in agro-biotechnology has been to increase costs, over 131 
conventional non GM varieties, by approximately 0.5 to 13.5 million USD [28].  We 132 
argue that regulation is the dominant shaper of both the innovation system and markets 133 
for innovative products in pharmaceuticals and agro-biotechnology. Specifically, it can 134 
constrain life science innovations through the complex, expensive and lengthy 135 
requirements imposed on developers of new drugs or pesticides. It has been recently 136 
suggested that clinical trials required by European regulators to compare biosimilar 137 
products with corresponding biologic brands are unnecessary and may impede the 138 
development of biosimilars of more complicated biologics [31]. Although this particular 139 
example is focused on biosimilars rather than novel biologics, it does highlight how 140 
regulation impacts on innovation.  The nature of the regulatory system for any given 141 
product can dictate the type of firms able to develop such products [4]. 142 
To highlight the role and influence of regulation on both sectors, we look briefly 143 
at two “disruptive technologies”; GM crops in the agro-biotechnology sector; and stem 144 
cells/regenerative medicine in the pharmaceutical sector. The systemic interactions of 145 
regulation and innovation for these two sectors and technology platforms are highlighted. 146 
A background to life science regulation is provided in Box 3.  147 
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 148 
Path-breaking Versus Path-Dependent Products and Regulation 149 
Scientific knowledge and technological advances in biotechnology have led to radically 150 
new path-breaking products in health and agriculture, including GM crops and stem-cell-151 
based therapies. In both cases, regulation has been considered crucial, but with no 152 
precedent for establishing a robust governance framework. In cases of new technologies, 153 
one can either look for existing regulatory regimes within which to place new product 154 
ranges, or design new path-breaking regulatory frameworks to meet the specific 155 
properties of the new technology. Based on our research [28-30], we consider it important 156 
to question the relationship between the emergence of path-breaking innovations and the 157 
putative need for path-breaking regulatory systems. 158 
Path-breaking innovations do not always require novel regulatory mechanisms.  159 
GM crops were a path-breaking technology - the agro-biotechnology industry expected 160 
that they would be disruptive and move the sector onto a new high value-added 161 
innovation model - but it was unclear for quite some time after heavy investment what the 162 
nature of the regulatory regime would be. While companies can cope with radical 163 
changes to their innovation systems, when these challenges are coupled with uncertainty 164 
in markets and regulatory systems that are outwith their control, disruption to the entire 165 
sector can be magnified [4]. 166 
  Innovation that is “path-breaking” for one company or sector may of course be 167 
“path-dependent” for another. For example, it was not inevitable that GM crops would be 168 
developed and marketed only by what were then agro-chemical firms, for which they 169 
were clearly path-breaking; GM crops disrupted the prevailing innovation model, 170 
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simultaneously impacting company R&D strategy (i.e. requiring a shift from chemistry- 171 
to biology-based development and production systems), markets (i.e. seed markets are 172 
very different from pesticide markets), and regulatory systems.   In the 1980s and early 173 
1990s, it was equally likely that food and seed companies would develop the technology. 174 
For these companies, the technology was path-dependent [4,30].  175 
A complex set of interactions between policymakers at European, U.S. and 176 
international levels, as well as among the agro-biotechnology, food production and 177 
distribution, and seed industry sectors, contributed to the overall framing of GM. It would 178 
have been beneficial to guide policymakers to adopt the regulatory system that applied to 179 
the industry sector for which the technology was path-dependent; in this case the seed 180 
companies. The regulation of GM crop varieties would have been easier (perhaps 181 
regulated under plant breeders’ rights) if the initial developers had been seed firms. This 182 
path-dependent regulatory approach may have made a difference to the direction of 183 
innovation in GM crops today and also to European public perception of the technology. 184 
This analysis also applies to the pharmaceutical sector in the case of stem cells 185 
and regenerative medicine. Stem cells, like GM crops, are potentially highly disruptive of 186 
prevailing pharmaceutical R&D systems, markets and regulatory systems. They require 187 
modification of company R&D strategies, moving from small-molecule innovation to 188 
complex biologics, and markets, which are very different to conventional blockbuster 189 
drug markets (smaller patient populations and delivery mechanisms for the product are 190 
far more complex, expensive and uncertain). The nature of the regulatory requirements 191 
also determines whether such products are developed by conventional multinational drug 192 
companies or smaller tissue engineering firms. In parallel with the GM crop example, 193 
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stem cells would be path-breaking for pharmaceutical multinationals, but path-dependent 194 
for smaller tissue engineering companies. Comparison with GM crops would suggest that 195 
if regulation of stem cells could be framed to be path-dependent for the smaller 196 
companies, we might see faster and more innovative development and uptake of novel 197 
therapies. However, if regulation continues to align more closely with the sector to which 198 
the technology is path-breaking (multinational pharmaceutical firms), which appears to 199 
be the case with the Advanced Therapies Regulation in Europe 200 
[http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:324:0121:0137:en:P201 
DF], we could see delays in the development of therapies and few small, innovative 202 
companies independently developing stem cell products. Whilst it is of course essential 203 
that stem cells and regenerative medicine products meet the key requirements of safety 204 
and efficacy, the question is whether the conventional regulations that apply to small 205 
molecule blockbuster products, and more conventional biologics, are appropriate for stem 206 
cells; especially when they may be a barrier to innovation. Whilst there are myths and 207 
uncertainties about the regulatory gaps and barriers to regenerative medicine [32], there is 208 
as yet no clear route to market for many small companies developing the technology and 209 
regulatory guidelines can be vague and ambiguous. Lessons from the regulation of GM 210 
crops may help us to develop regulatory processes for stem cells that encourage, rather 211 
than impede, those companies best placed to innovate in this area.  212 
 213 
Conclusion: key lessons for new “smart” approaches to regulation  214 
Regulatory systems tend to evolve incrementally over long time periods, which make 215 
them susceptible to becoming inflexible and out-of-step with the latest innovations and 216 
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technologies. Furthermore, regulation can become so complex that modifications to one 217 
set of regulations have unforeseen consequences for other parts of the regulatory system 218 
and for the innovation community. However, de novo creation of path-breaking 219 
regulation for path-breaking technology also poses difficulties and challenges and could 220 
just as easily discourage innovation as encourage it.  221 
From our extensive research exploring innovation and regulation interactions in the 222 
pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology sectors [2-6; 9, 10, 14, 30] we consider there to 223 
be a number of key lessons for better governance of innovative life science technologies, 224 
such as GM crops and stem cells [Box 4]. 225 
The life sciences continue to be of high strategic importance to both developed 226 
and emerging economies and shape many innovative industries. But life science 227 
innovation is largely dominated by a relatively small number of multinational companies, 228 
and regulatory systems often serve to maintain the status quo. Regulation is an 229 
insurmountable barrier to many small start-up companies with innovative ideas that 230 
challenge prevailing orthodoxy. Whilst it would of course be inappropriate to lower 231 
safety and efficacy standards for life science-based products, the development of a 232 
smarter approach to regulation, which we have outlined, could bring about a more 233 
favourable climate for innovation.    234 
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Box 1. Agro-biotechnology company strategies 350 
Distinct strategies were employed by leading agro-biotechnology companies.  These 351 
strategies were conceived in response to external pressures, including low farm 352 
commodity prices and income; erosion of profit margins; more aggressive competition as 353 
a result of agribusiness restructuring; and the emergence of new technologies, such as 354 
genetic modification and molecular marker technologies, which challenged conventional 355 
farming practice. The narrowing of chemical pipelines also crucially drove this need for a 356 
new strategic vision. Companies employed these different strategies to respond to 357 
maturity and pressures in the innovation environment.  358 
 359 
“Buying the route to market” 360 
Monsanto (from the 1980s) and Dupont both invested heavily in building the GM 361 
technology base for the world’s major commodity markets: corn, soya and cotton. 362 
Moving from selling agrochemicals to selling seeds required a new marketing strategy, 363 
and both companies invested large sums in acquiring seed companies. Monsanto invested 364 
$8bn alone between 1996 and 1999 and DuPont  purchased Pioneer in 1999 for $7bn [9]. 365 
 366 
 “Collaboration along the route to market” 367 
AgrEvo, Zeneca, Novartis, Rhone Poulenc and Dow also invested significantly in 368 
building a GM technology base throughout the 1980s, but they focused more on 369 
collaboration with seed companies rather than on outright purchases. This was a more 370 
incremental strategy which gathered momentum in the mid 1990s.  371 
 372 
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“Jumping on the bandwagon” 373 
BASF and Bayer were intentionally several years behind other agro-biotechnology 374 
companies in investing in GM technology, preferring to wait and to benefit from the 375 
experience of other companies. BASF began investment in the mid-1990s and Bayer in 376 
the early 2000s.  377 
378 
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Box 2. Key challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry (1990s – present day) 379 
1. Decline in productivity despite increases in R&D investment. The problem of product 380 
maturity coupled with low productivity led to perception of “innovation deficit” that 381 
continues today [19]. Since 1996, the number of small molecules approved by regulators 382 
has been in decline and the number of new active compounds discovered has remained 383 
constant. Companies are not generating enough new compounds in-house for sustainable 384 
growth [20]. 385 
 386 
2. High attrition rate of compounds, particularly during Phase II clinical trials. Lack of 387 
demonstrable safety and efficacy has been the principal cause of attrition, which partly 388 
explains why companies experiment with new “translational sciences” [21,22], 389 
particularly those centred on identifying and validating novel biomarkers.   390 
 391 
3. Rising overall costs of drug discovery owing to the need for new, experimental 392 
methodological approaches to R&D; increasing internationalisation of research and its 393 
competitive environment, and increasing demands from regulators and healthcare 394 
providers. In 2007, the cost for a firm to bring one product to market was estimated to be 395 
$800 million USD [23].  396 
 397 
4. Some early biotechnology firms were successful in transforming themselves into 398 
large multinationals (Amgen, Genzyme, Genentech and Geron); but later growth in 399 
biotechnology has been slow. Today the chances of a small biotechnology firm becoming 400 
a large, independent company appears bleak given the high barriers to entry. 401 
 402 
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5. There are now more partnerships between public and private institutes to pool 403 
information and attempt delivery of niche products, including orphan drugs and products 404 
vaccines for developing countries. Nevertheless, the dominant model continues to rely on 405 
“blockbuster drugs” rather than targeted drugs for niche markets. Despite the promises of 406 
the life sciences, multinational pharmaceutical firms did not seek to fully transform 407 
themselves into biotechnology companies; in contrast to some of the agro-biotechnology 408 
companies like Monsanto. Indeed, there has not yet been a pharmaceutical equivalent to 409 
Monsanto. 410 
411 
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Box 3: The nature of regulation in the life sciences 412 
Whilst it is obvious that regulation impacts product development, we suggest that the 413 
impact of regulation is much more far reaching than just ensuring goods are safe, 414 
effective and high-quality – [28]. It determines overall company strategy, the types of 415 
firm that will succeed in bringing products to market, and the structural dynamics of the 416 
sector as a whole. For example, if we compare the lightly regulated Information and 417 
Communication Technologies ICT sector with the heavily regulated life sciences, the 418 
former has a much greater turnover of products and capabilities arising from 419 
technological innovation. In ICT, small start-up companies can quickly become major 420 
players by developing innovations that challenge the status quo. Most candidates for 421 
product development in the health and agricultural sectors will fail (only one out of 422 
approximately 200,000 molecules initially screened will make it to product launch); 423 
therefore, innovation in life sciences appears far more linear than industries such as ICT 424 
[29]. Life science innovation is dominated by a small group of multinationals, which we 425 
argue is partly due to the fact that the regulatory system poses an insurmountable barrier 426 
for many new entrants with innovations that threaten to disrupt the status quo.   427 
The markets for life science products are also different from most other industries, 428 
inasmuch as few are marketed directly to consumers. Pesticides and GM crops are sold to 429 
farmers, and new medicinal products are mainly sold to health services [10]. The unique 430 
combination of regulation and markets for life sciences has therefore had major impacts 431 
on the structural dynamics and strategic management of both the pharmaceutical and 432 
agro-biotechnology sectors. 433 
 434 
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 435 
Box 4 : Key lessons for good governance of the life sciences 436 
(1) Regulatory initiatives can have significant, rapid and positive influences on the 437 
innovation system. Such insights on successes should be used as exemplars when 438 
designing regulatory systems for new innovations.  439 
(2) Regulations appropriate for one area can have unexpected and/or negative impacts 440 
when applied to other areas. Application of conventional clinical trial systems to 441 
stem cells could be a major constraint, with adaptations to mechanisms such as 442 
the ‘hospital exemption route’ for the development of therapies for named 443 
patients perhaps a better way to facilitate innovation. This problem becomes more 444 
likely and significant when regulators lack knowledge and understanding of the 445 
new technologies.  446 
(3) A regulatory policy that is enabling in that it encourages positive change in 447 
industry strategies and appropriately discriminates among products on the basis of 448 
socially and economically relevant criteria, will generally be more effective and 449 
efficient than a policy that is indiscriminate and seeks to constrain what it 450 
considers undesirable behaviour.  451 
(4) The enabling criterion affects the rapidity with which a particular regulatory 452 
policy can exert influence, while the range, scope and appropriateness of its 453 
discrimination among products and processes will determine its effectiveness in 454 
guiding desirable product development. 455 
(5) Path-breaking regulation for path-breaking technology should not be the norm but  456 
the last resort once all other options have been exhausted. Other options might 457 
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include a focus on ‘substantial equivalence’. If the new technology or product is 458 
substantially equivalent to an existing product, path-breaking regulation should 459 
not be necessary.  460 
(6) In considering which regulatory precedent is most appropriate for a new 461 
technology, a useful approach would be to prioritise the regulatory system for the 462 
industry sector for which the innovation is path-dependent rather than path-463 
breaking. This would ensure the sector better positioned to quickly take forward 464 
the product to market is encouraged to do so.  465 
 466 
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